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JURISPRUDENCE A TEACHING PROBLEM
MIRIAM T. ROONEY*

H OW

TO TEACH JURISPRUDENCE is one of the most puzzling problems with which American law schools are confronted. Not only
is the subject complex, but also teachers of competence are scarce because of the need for expertness in philosophy and history as well as
law. The few who are looked upon as authorities are in most cases selftaught and have designed their own methods. Occasionally disciples
of the more famous teachers have consciously imitated their masters in
presenting the subject. There is no real agreement on an accepted course
content. Furthermore, not every law school includes Jurisprudence
in its curriculum, and the desirability of its inclusion or exclusion
provides ground for intermittent debates among faculty curriculum
committees. It is possible that a lack of a satisfactory teaching technique may be the cause rather than the result of professional uncertainties
about offering the course. Whatever the reasons, the omission of
systematic discussion of the origins, function, and objectives of juridical
activities has a crippling effect on the all-around development of firstrate legal minds, and tends to keep law schools in the technical trade
school class rather than in the forefront of university education, where
they traditionally and functionally belong. Not until the teaching of
Jurisprudence is again recognized as basic in the curriculum, will the
faculties of law regain their rightful heritage of acknowledged leadership
in the university world.
The question of how to teach Jurisprudence mirrors to some extent
the nineteenth-century disputes over how to teach law in general. Between
1830 and 1870, law schools throughout the land based their instruction
largely on treatises, text-books, and lectures, some relying primarily
on Blackstone's Commentaries, others using works of original composition, like Story's or Kent's, Cooley's or Greenleaf's, for the study of
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substantive or procedural subjects. Even
thirty or forty years after Langdell had
introduced the case method of analysis at
Harvard in 1870, many law schools still
resisted, the displacement of favorite texts.
It seems to have been through the development of a class of crusading professional
law teachers, who themselves or through
their students began to take over the staffing of the more influential law schools, that
the casebook method of teaching has now
become almost universal in this country.
Today influential professors often become
recognized as such because they have formulated the pattern of the casebooks which
have been most widely adopted in their
special fields. In Jurisprudence, however,
for the most part, casebooks are still largely
unformed.
In the place of case analysis, the method
of teaching Jurisprudence has veered from
lectures based largely on Salmond's or Holland's treatises on the one side, to biographical manuals about well-known writers
in the field on the other. Volumes by Stone
and Simpson, Cohen and Cohen, Patterson, and Reuschlein are examples. The
successive editions of Roscoe Pound's
bibliographical guides to the literature of
Jurisprudence have not featured the common-law jurists mentioned in the other law
school courses as much as those who write
out of a 'civil-law background, to which
most American law students are largely
strangers. Such an eclectic method tends to
be confusing rather than stimulating, and it
may be largely responsible for the attitude
of American law students toward Jurisprudence as an impractical luxury among law
school studies.
The first book prepared for law school
use which included excerpts from actual

cases proposed for class analysis, seems to
have been Jerome Hall's Readings in Juris-

prudence, published in 1938. However, the
bulk of the Readings consists less of judicial
opinions calling for philosophical analysis
than quotations from Writers on jurisprudential subjects illustrative of the topics
suggested by a carefully pre-arranged classification scheme. Without espousing any
particular philosophical system, the compilation is primarily informational in a way
similar to the earlier treatises, while making
a definite advance by the substitution of
verbatim quotations in place of paraphrases.
Materials suitable for critical analysis are
thereby provided, although a fully rounded
out analytical technique for utilizing them
in encouraging the student to reason
through to his own philosophy is left for
the individual professor to work out.
The next teaching tool developed was
the temporary edition of The Problems of
Jurisprudenceby Lon Fuller in 1949. This
gave longer excerpts from a smaller number
of representative writers than Hall's book,
and was designed more obviously for analytical class dissection than for survey
purposes. Its most important pedagogical
innovation was the inclusion of three hypothetical cases with fictitious court opinions
and dissents, which afford inimitable opportunities for the analysis of the philosophical
ideas implicit in the judges' statements, and
at the same time suggest that theories of
law, consciously or unconsciously held, may
be significant in pronouncing a judgment.
For a case-minded legal profession, the
way had now been paved for a full-fledged
casebook on Jurisprudence; the wonder is
that it had taken so long to prepare the
ground.
At the same time that the methods of
teaching Jurisprudence were proving so
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troublesome, the content itself was undergoing considerable transformation. About
1830, when law schools were beginning to
supplant the apprentice training obtainable
in practitioners' offices, the eighteenth-century notions of *natural law, which had
helped to launch the American Revolution
successfully, still prevailed. Precise comprehension of natural law principles was
largely lacking, however, and competence
in- philosophy itself was apparently rare.
The decadence of the thinking done in the
name of the natural law' was manifest and
left the door open to the cleaner cut positivism of Comte, Bentham and John Austin.
The demand for codification, inaugurated
with Napoleon, Bentham, and David Dudley Field, and worked over during most
of the nineteenth century by the German
jurists, took the ascendancy. It was not
until the end of the century that the need
for better criteria of human values than
positivism provided, gave rise to a new
school of thought which became influential
under the name of sociological jurisprudence. Even as late as 1909, however, positivism was still vigorous enough to produce
the lectures of John Chipman Gray on The
Nature and Sources of the Law, although
this was almost the last important publication derived directly from Austin's influence. The earlier natural law tradition had
been so effectively superseded by the energetic positivists that as recently as 1931,
Benjamin Fletcher Wright could say that
natural law was not generally accepted in
American intellectual circles any more.
It could scarcely have been anticipated
then, that within the next twenty years, legal
positivism would have been recognized by
its own advocates as inadequate, especially
in not anticipating the threat of the Nazi
and Communist subversions of the legal
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order. By way of substitution, two false
starts were made, one under the name of
the new realism, and the other spoken of
as the revival of natural law concepts. The
new realism was an effort made by rmore or
less disillusioned positivists to do away with
outmoded forms and formulae, but without
reckoning with the pervading substance of
law underneath. The attempt to identify
natural law with concepts or ideals was
equally disappointing, because it undertook to retain the traditional terms while
varying the content according to the mind
of each theorist. The implied identification
of natural law with the concept of due
process, for example, was indicative of
the shallowness of the comprehension of
philosophy prevailing. Furthermore, both
groups derived from positivism a subjectivist approach to law instead of recognizing
the existence of an objective legal order to
which the human mind must conform at its
peril. Actually all things measure man, and
man is not the measure of all things, as
these schools of thought would have had
us believe. And so the call for a truly
realistic jurisprudence, which is in fact an
existent, not a conceptualistic natural law,
still persists. To meet it, nothing less than
a reconstructed course in Jurisprudence
will be satisfactory.
Possibly as a means of bridging the gap,
Bobbs-Merrill, who had published Hall's
pioneer Readings in Jurisprudencein 1938,
brought out in 1954 an 882-page volume
entitled Preface to Jurisprudenceby a professor at Brooklyn Law School, Orvill
Snyder. This publication, in my opinion,
however, does not satisfy the recognized
need. The table of contents discloses that
the book is organized around such topics
as the state as lawgiver, the sovereignty of
the state, lawmaking, law-executing action,
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sanctions, interpretation of statutes, judicial legislation, proof, things and persons,
and the classification of laws. The book is
divided into six parts, which are in turn
subdivided into chapters. Each chapter has
some introductory observations or comments by the author, followed by excerpts
from judicial opinions in a number of important cases. The cases are interspersed by
incisive questions designed to stimulate vigorous class discussion.
Given this framework, what does the
book say? The chapter headings give the
first clue for they sound less like Maitland, Coke and Bracton, than like Hobbes,
Bentham, Austin and Kelsen, all of whom
were more conversant with the civilian system than with the indigenous institutions of
the common law. The footnote citations
provide the next indication that the author
places great reliance on these writers, as
well as upon Gray, Hohfeld, Patterson, and,
most of all, Kocourek, his own teacher.
Analysis of the text itself also discloses the
acknowledged predilection the compiler has
for principles historically classified as positivistic: the notion that all law is made by
commands of the sovereign; is to be found
within the four corners of a written document; is to be applied by the judges in
accordance with the specific directions of
the lawgiver, without recourse to any outside or "higher" legal principles or means
of interpretation; and with the inevitable
application of authoritatively enforced sanctions if the command is not obeyed. Were
this not evidence enough, there is the declaration of the author himself that the method
adopted "... is that of analytical jurisprudence ... ," that is, the method characteristically utilized by followers of Austin and
other exponents of the positivistic school.
Interspersed among the cases, in addi-

tion to the introductory texts, are some
keen questions designed to assist the student to cut out the chaff from judicial
opinions whenever they appear hazy, lazy,
or actually confused. Many of them are
obviously aimed at puncturing the balloons
let loose by spurious notions of natural law.
Other questions are designed to challenge
more basic natural law premises. None,
however, seems to raise any doubts about
the validity of such characteristically positivistic assertions as, "the command issues
from the sanction; if there is no sanction,
there is no command and no law . . ."
although this would appear to be putting
the cart in front of the horse. The kind of
questions which are generally asked and
which require very serious consideration,
are illustrated by the following: whether
there is any relationship between a theorist's
notion of the law and his theory of the state;
whether it is possible to understand our
system of jurisprudence apart from our
concept of sovereignty; and whether the
theory of natural law is inconsistent with
the concept of sovereignty of the people.
Another important line of questions asks
whether overruling decisions constitute, in
effect, ex post facto law, and a recurring
series of questions inquires as to who is in
fact doing the interpreting of our laws and
upon what bases. Perhaps the question
which reveals most about the author's personal attitude toward the natural law
school, and toward interpretations of law
by the jurists whom he calls "exponents of
some authoritarian ethical system," as contrasted with those who hold law to be
merely the command of a recognized
sovereign supported by state force, is to
be found on page 180, where he asks:
"Granted the abstract validity of the natural
law, is the use of natural-law theory any-
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thing other than some hocus-pocus by
which the interpreters of the natural law
seek to become the secret actual sovereign?"
These questions are obviously searching
and well-suited to classroom discussion.
Rarely have some of them been stated with
such directness. But to a greater degree.
than is perhaps realized, they may exist
more or less unspoken in the minds of
many jurists trained in the positivistic tradition, who are influential in directing the
course of current legal activity. For that
reason they must be answered, and answered as frankly as they have been asked.
It is not the asking of such questions to
which objection may be made. It is rather
the continued repetition of such questions,
aimed almost entirely at the natural law
school, while de-emphasizing comparable
questions aimed at a searching re-examination of the premises of positivism, conceptualism and other schools of juridical
thought, which makes these questions seem
rhetorical, if not, in fact, loaded. The practice of addressing such questions to tyros in
legal theory, when many mature scholars
in jurisprudence have not previously been
so challenged, also seems to take unfair
advantage over youthful minds. The effect
on a student, dependent upon this book
for his introduction to Jurisprudence, of
such one-sided probing, is likely to result
either in a cynical prejudice against natural
law theories generally, or an unshakable
skepticism about the value of any legal
order not based upon state force. Is this
what is needed to help able young American law students understand the foundations of the common-law system which they
are studying, and devote their best energies
to improving it as a guarantee of justice
and freedom?
Were the text in this book, which is inter-
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spersed throughout the chapters, to indicate
impartially the several major schools of
juridical thought to which many able minds
have adhered throughout history, and were
this done in such a way as to permit the
student to select and test the validity of
some of them for himself in attempting to
decide how much better the judgments in
the cases could be, the book might be a
very valuable tool for developing a better
technique in teaching Jurisprudence. The
cases are important, interesting, and well
selected for analysis and class discussion.
The idea of offering each of them as a
challenge to the thinking of each student,
so that he will learn to avoid clich6s and
the reiteration of the obvious, is good. The
use of American cases almost exclusively
for jurisprudential materials is a very practical method of inculcating a consciousness
of the philosophical problems which exist
in almost every situation with which law
has to deal.
Indeed, the book would have a great
deal to recommend it if, in fact, it provided
a fair presentation of the philosophical
principles that traditionally lie at the foundations of the centuries-old common-law
system, instead of advocating an alien philosophy characteristic of statism. By practically ignoring the natural law and by
offering in its place what is in 6ffect an
apologia for. positivism exclusively, the
book is as out of date as it is inadequate.
Furthermore it is deceptive in having the
appearance of an objective study, when it
is not. The book constitutes in effect an
indoctrination of a very subtle kind. Instead
of being a welcome addition to the needed
tools for teaching Jurisprudence, it must
therefore be condemned, like all half-truths,
as dangerous, especially for youthful minds
who have not yet attained a sufficiently
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well-rounded knowledge of philosophical
theories generally to meet the incisive mind
of the proponent, fairly and frankly, before
an impartial tribunal.
The immediate problem is the designing
of a teaching tool which will open the eyes
of the students to the extent and importance
of the problems not yet solved, instead of
offering plausible answers to questions that
seldom, if ever, need to be asked. A selection of actual judicial opinions laid before
the students for dissection and devaluation
- an adaptation of the casebook method of
critical analysis to the complex subject of
Jurisprudence - would appear to provide
the most effective training for those who,
as the advocates and judges of the next few
decades, will have to draw upon their own
personally developed philosophies in coming to grips with the actual human situations that confront them. But the desired
casebook will not meet the current need
successfully unless it indicates somewhere
along the way the substantial principles
upon which a sound jurisprudence has to

be based. The call for realism and the
growing interest in a revival of natural law
theories would seem to imply also that the
needed casebook in Jurisprudence should
somehow emphasize a truly realistic natural
law system instead of the outmoded positivism or the impractical conceptualism
which proved inadequate in meeting the
great juridical crises of the first half of
the twentieth century.
In an effort to meet the double need of
a new teaching tool and an exposition of an
objective approach to natural law thinking,
the editors of the leading law book series,
West Publishing Company, had persuaded
Dr. John C. H. Wu two or three years ago
to undertake the compilation of a casebook
in Jurisprudence for classroom use. That
book is now scheduled for publication in
1958. It is anxiously awaited in the expectation that it will come much closer toward
providing a solution to the insistent problem of an adequate teaching tool than any
other book which has heretofore been made
available to the law teaching profession.

LAST MINUTE ITEM
As we go to press, the New Jersey State Supreme Court voted
5-2 that churches and other non-profit charitable organizations in
New Jersey are now liable to damage suits initiated in New Jersey
civil courts. The decision upsets a legal precedent first established
in England 119 years ago. Thus three suits, including one against
St. Luke's Roman Catholic Church, Hohokus, were thrown back
to the lower Courts for retrial. St. Luke's was sued for $50,000 by
a woman claiming she slipped on a wet church floor on a rainy day
because a mat had been removed.
A complete coverage of the legal status of the injured churchgoer
under the law of the various states is set forth on pages 180-182 of
this issue.

